Since returning to the White House, President Donald Trump has catalyzed a seismic shift in US foreign policy. He signed executive orders pulling the United States out of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization. His delegation to the United Nations twice voted with Russia rather than with European allies on resolutions regarding the war in Ukraine. He started a trade war with Canada and Mexico and then expanded it to a war on global free trade. He floated the idea of a US “take over” of Gaza, a move that would escalate the forced displacement of Palestinians. He paid the self-described “world’s coolest dictator” six million dollars to imprison alleged gang members deported from the US. And he has repeatedly advocated annexing Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal.
As President Trump barrels through the first 100 days of his second term, it is time to evaluate his administration’s impact on global affairs. This time around, the Trump administration is accelerating its efforts to dismantle the rules-based international order.
Built after the Allies’ victory in WWII, this order consists of institutions that structure interactions between nation-states. It comprises security alliances, international trade agreements, diplomatic practices, and humanitarian aid. This order, built and maintained largely by the United States and Europe, has benefitted the United States since its creation. It’s how the US can claim to lead the “free world.” It’s how the US became a global superpower—indeed, the most powerful country on Earth. Without it, the US would be short on allies, friends, markets, and influence.
To evaluate Trump’s impact on global affairs thus far, this essay first reviews the Trump administration’s slashing of foreign aid and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Then, it moves to assess the changing US posture towards security and trade partners by scrutinizing some of the Trump administration’s moves regarding trade, Ukraine, and NATO. Finally, in pulling together Trump’s vision for US foreign policy, this essay posits that a better vision of foreign policy exists, one where the United States is a reliable, respectable, and resilient ally and partner.
The Policy: Dismantling USAID
On Inauguration Day, Trump issued an executive order directing a freeze of foreign assistance funding and a review of all US aid and development work abroad. The president and his special government employee, Elon Musk, charge that most foreign assistance is wasteful and advances a liberal agenda contrary to the United States’ national interest.
In carrying out the executive order, the Trump administration put nearly all of USAID’s 4,700 full-time employees on paid administrative leave, then subsequently moved to terminate 1,600 of those positions. In one instance, these forced firings created turmoil for USAID workers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, who were ordered to leave but were not supplied with organizational resources to return to the United States.
Less than two months after Trump’s order, Secretary of State Marco Rubio pronounced the foreign aid audit complete, noting that at least 83% of USAID’s program contracts were terminated. The rapid pace of the review, coupled with few details on which aid programs were spared and why, left USAID supporters and non-governmental aid groups questioning the decision-making process that led the United States to pull back from, for instance, providing food aid for starving children and women displaced by the civil war in Sudan.[1]
In an attempt to preserve USAID, a group of USAID employees sued Elon Musk. On March 18, District Court Judge Theodore Chuang ruled that the dismantling of USAID violated the Constitution and blocked Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) from making further financial and personnel cuts to the agency. With Congress having established USAID as a statutory independent agency in the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Judge Chuang concluded that actions taken to gut and halt the work of USAID harmed the public interest by depriving elected lawmakers of their “constitutional authority to decide whether, when and how to close down an agency created by Congress.”
The 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did not agree with Judge Chuang, blocking his injunction against DOGE. In a March 28 ruling, the appeals court sided with Musk over the USAID employees, finding that Musk did not act as an official officer of the United States (because he has not actually been appointed to a government position) and therefore could not be sued for the administration’s actions. That said, the ruling did leave open the possibility for a future constitutional challenge of the executive branch’s actions in effectively closing USAID.
The History: Foreign Aid Benefits the United States
A common misperception by the American public is that foreign aid constitutes a large portion of the federal budget. A 2025 survey conducted by the University of Maryland School of Public Policy found people overestimate US expenditures on foreign aid. Most respondents estimate that around 20 percent of the budget is allocated to foreign aid, with a majority indicating they believe it should be at least 10 percent.
In reality, foreign aid has made up less than 1.6% of the federal budget for decades. In fiscal year 2023, the US government disbursed $71.9 billion in foreign aid. That works out to 1.2% of that year’s total federal expenditures, which were more than $6.1 trillion. Americans’ misperception about foreign aid allows the Trump administration to cut USAID by claiming it is going after waste and fraud.
While cuts to USAID may appeal to Trump’s political base, they undermine US national interests in both the security and economic realms. This political maneuvering prioritizes optics over effective policy, ultimately harming both the US and global welfare.
According to the Congressional Research Service, there are three rationales for distributing foreign aid in the age of Pax Americana:
- National security—foreign aid extends American presence abroad and counters adversaries’ global influence.
- Commercial interests—foreign aid promotes US exports by forging new markets for American goods and services, while shaping the global economic environment favorably for US companies.
- Humanitarian concerns—foreign aid helps people after crisis or disaster, alleviating human suffering, reducing poverty, and fighting disease.
The 1948 Marshall Plan, proposed by Secretary of State George Marshall and authorized by President Harry Truman, illustrates all three of these rationales. In the context of rebuilding Europe after WWII, one of the rationales for the Marshall Plan, which provided $13.3 billion of aid, was to counter communist influence in Western Europe. In addition to mitigating the appeal of communism by bolstering postwar capitalist economies, the plan laid the groundwork to secure military base rights and other forms of military support in the fight against the Soviet Union, particularly in Turkey. A second reason the US spent billions to rebuild Europe was to restore the region’s capability to trade with the United States. Lastly, the plan succeeded at its aim of alleviating short-term hunger and poverty by providing goods like fuel and food, while addressing long-term welfare by rebuilding schools and other infrastructure—all of which, in turn, supported the first two goals of diminishing the appeal of communism and developing stable allies capable of buying American goods.
Presidents from both major parties have used foreign aid for these ends. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Food for Peace program—the Kansan-born president’s solution for dealing with America’s grain surplus—increased US farmers’ exports in addition to feeding hungry people. The program changed the food environment enough in the Philippines that today, Filipino fast food fried chicken company Jollibee famously features spaghetti as a key menu item, as it continues to utilize US wheat. Prior to Trump’s 2025 cuts, Food for Peace bought about $2 billion of American farm commodities annually that were used to feed billions of people in 150 countries.
In the early 21st century, facing a global HIV epidemic, President George W. Bush created the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR. As of 2025, PEPFAR has provided training for more than 340,000 healthcare workers worldwide and saved more than 26 million lives, including over 7.8 million children born HIV-free. Such assistance clearly makes a difference globally and fosters goodwill towards the United States.
Most recently, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, President Joe Biden worked to pass several bipartisan aid packages for Ukraine. This aid not only supported ideals related to democracy and state sovereignty, but it also kept one of the United States’ chief geopolitical rivals occupied in a regional conflict, draining Russia of resources and providing valuable intelligence for the US military.
At the start of Trump’s second term, foreign policy watchers were hopeful that Secretary Rubio would moderate Trump’s anti-aid position by defending foreign aid as a tool to further American interests. Such hope was based on Rubio’s experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and his multiple public statements, spanning over a decade, defending foreign aid as “a very cost-effective way, not only to export our values and our example, but to advance our security and our economic interests.” Secretary Rubio’s actions to drastically cut USAID programing do not reflect his expertise on the issue; moreover, such decisions create a vacuum on the world stage welcomed by adversaries like China and Iran.
The New Normal? The US Seeks Clients, Not Friends
Beyond foreign aid, the Trump administration has departed from the longstanding bipartisan foreign policy consensus that the United States should foster and follow international agreements that promote peace, stability, and cooperation among nations. This departure is best illustrated by Trump’s April 2 “Liberation Day” proclamation, where he announced “reciprocal” tariffs, some as high as 50%, for imports from numerous countries.
Such a move represents a dramatic change in the global order in terms of trade, something Canada and Mexico have been dealing with since the beginning of Trump’s second term. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s response to Liberation Day captures the global significance of the move: “The 80-year period when the United States embraced the mantle of global economic leadership, when it forged alliances rooted in trust and mutual respect and championed the free and open exchange of goods and services, is over. While this is a tragedy, it is also the new reality.”
Liberation Day was short-lived. One week after Trump’s Rose Garden announcement—a week that saw trillions of dollarsin shareholder value evaporate and American bond market interest rates rise—Trump announced a shift to a universal 10% tariff rate, except for China whose several new tariffs total 145%. Reliable friends and partners—and risk-averse capitalists—prioritize clarity and consistency in their dealings with one another. They don’t manufacture chaos and uncertainty.
The shift in treatment from friend to client is not contained to global trade. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy is also reshaping security politics. In the first 100 days, the defining moment of this shift is the February 28 Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelenskyy. Billed as a moment for the two leaders to sign a critical minerals deal—an agreement with no security guarantees, which the Trump administration characterized as repayment for past US aid—the meeting ended with Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance admonishing Zelenskyy and accusing him of being ungrateful for American assistance. Zelensky left without signing the deal.
After departing Washington, Zelenskyy traveled to meet with leaders from Europe, Canada, and Turkey. In a summit spearheaded by the United Kingdom, notably not including a US delegation, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a four-pillar framework for peace and billions of pounds in aid to Ukraine. While European support for Ukraine is crucial, the lack of US support has already emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. As the old adage goes, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” Why would Putin negotiate at a time when the US is pulling back, a move that makes Putin’s advance in Ukraine easier? As made clear by Russia’s reported violations of the Trump-negotiated energy-infrastructure ceasefire deal, Russia’s word is not a guarantee for Ukraine’s security. The path to peace in Ukraine lies in demonstrating to Putin that the US stands resolutely with its allies and backs Ukraine.
Return of the Skeptic: Questioning NATO’s Collective Security
The Trump administration’s retreat from supporting Ukraine is paired with Trump’s renewed skepticism toward NATO and its guarantee of collective security. Asked a question about whether the US would defend NATO allies if they were not spending “their fair share” on defense, the American president responded that the US won’t defend countries not paying their bills and that NATO countries should be spending at least 5% of their GDP on defense. Moreover, Trump questioned whether NATO allies would come to the defense of the United States, asking, “Do you think they’re going to come and protect us? Hmm. They’re supposed to. I’m not so sure.”
This statement is disparaging to US allies for several reasons. First, the United States is the only country that has invoked NATO’s Article 5. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on US soil, multinational NATO troops conducted anti-terrorism operations and patrolled American skies, and NATO eventually led the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Irreverently questioning the willingness of allies to contribute—when they collectively lost over 1,000 soldiers alongside US troops on missions at the behest of the United States—not only betrays astounding historical ignorance but damages American credibility and goodwill among allies who showed up for the Unites States in its darkest hour.
Second, NATO allies are not given a bill to pay. Since 2006, NATO countries have pledged, though not made a hard treaty commitment, to spending a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defense spending to ensure the Alliance’s military readiness. US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both subsequently encouraged NATO countries to increase their defense investments. What Trump has done here is move the goalpost to a level not even the United States reaches; currently, the US does not spend 5% of its GDP on defense.
Third, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, numerous NATO members have increased defense spending as a share of GDP. As of 2024, only eight of thirty-two member states are not hitting the 2% guideline. Why would the US pull back from NATO when most allies are meeting the agreed upon spending guideline? Why would the US downsize its presence in Europe, when it has a real opportunity to lead an increasingly powerful alliance? It makes no sense to abandon American commitments to, and therefore US influence on, European security policy.
Such retrenchment has consequences. For instance, Poland and likely other countries seeking nuclear weapons to protect themselves. This goes against another key pillar of the rules-based international order championed by the United States: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While individual countries may have an incentive to acquire nuclear weapons to feel more secure, a world with more nuclear weapons is not a safer world. More weapons of mass destruction mean more opportunities for nuclear accidents, for nuclear weapons to be used in battle, or for nuclear bombs to end up in dangerous hands.
Creating the NATO alliance was not an act of altruism on the part of the United States. The reason why the US played a key role in the creation of NATO and helped sustain it for over 75 years was national self-interest, not altruism. Yes, there are shared democratic values and economic interests, but the core reason was that the United States was worried about the spread of communism and the costs of yet another war in Europe. The US lost over 500,000 soldiers in the two world wars. The US and all signatories to the NATO Treaty reasoned that they should try to prevent such conflict, as war is far more costly and destructive than deterring a conflict in the first place. That’s what NATO is about. It is about deterring a widespread, massively destructive European war. And in terms of peace, NATO has been successful in that we have not seen a direct great-power war since its founding.
A New World Order?
With or without the United States’ cooperation, there will be a world order that governs how countries interact on the global stage. The United States should help lead that order to foster global stability, promote democratic values, and safeguard national interests.
Based on Trump’s foreign policy actions in the first 100 days of his second term, a different vision for world order is evident. On the one hand, Trump’s approach prioritizes retrenchment and withdrawal from international engagement, viewing foreign aid as an unnecessary expense rather than a strategic investment in global stability. His vision entails minimal involvement in foreign affairs. It follows that the US should focus solely on domestic issues and refrain from supporting partners like Ukraine, thereby allowing authoritarian regimes to assert their influence unchecked.
On the other hand, Trump speaks of a return to American imperialism and protectionism. He floats the idea of annexing territory that belongs to sovereign states and is erratically using tariffs as a blunt tool to exert influence over other countries’ economies. In Trump’s vision, transactional relationships and disengagement from global responsibilities are emphasized over clarity and reliability in international relationships.
Positioning the United States this way could foster an environment of unpredictability and chaos, undermining the very principles of cooperation and mutual respect that are vital for the rules-based order that made the United States a superpower. Should the Trump administration continue down the path it has so enthusiastically sprinted, the government risks diminishing America’s role as a global leader, eroding trust and partnerships with allies, and leaving the nation vulnerable to the threats posed by rising authoritarianism and geopolitical instability.
Ultimately, a benevolent United States is beneficial for America and a cornerstone for global peace and prosperity. America will not enter a “Golden Age” by dismantling the rules-based international order that the United States has spent the last 80 years shaping and leading. What will allow America to prosper in the 21st century is collaborating with allies and partners to develop fair trade agreements, promote collective security, and work to alleviate human suffering. As the Trump administration continues past the first 100 days, it is vital for Americans to demand a foreign policy that actually benefits the United States. To foster reliable partnerships for the future, the US should commit to leading with purpose, ensuring that the principles of cooperation, respect, and resilience remain at the forefront of international relations.
Featured Image: From left to right: President Trump talking with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House (April 7, 2025); President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office (February 28, 2025); President Trump and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick announcing “reciprocal” tariffs in the Rose Garden (April 2, 2025). Photo Credit: The White House Flickr Account.
[1] In addition to slashing aid programs, the Trump administration sought to withhold nearly $2 billion in payments to organizations for work they already performed for the government. On March 5, a divided Supreme Court turned down the Trump administration’s request to lift a district court’s order prohibiting the government from pausing the disbursement of such funds.
Clio and the Contemporary 